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Dear Arthur,

I am sorry not to have replied more promptly to your letter dated 7th October, but this term has been rather hectic as I have been lecturing both at Oxford and in London and elsewhere backwards and forwards between the two places!

Now the term has ended I have added back to read your interesting paper on Correlations and Physical Locality.

But first let me explain my point about your 1977 proof that the Correlation Rule, together with Conservation and Fact, leads to inconsistency. The assumption of locality comes in, as I see it, because you do not allow the possibility that the value of $I \otimes B$ in the state $U(\phi \otimes \xi)$ depends on whether you are measuring A or $f(A)$ on the first system. If you did not assume locality you would have the ^{variate}
$$[A \otimes I]^{U(\phi \otimes \xi)} = x_m \Rightarrow [I \otimes B]^{U(\phi \otimes \xi)} = y_m \quad (1)$$

and also
$$[I \otimes B]^{U(\phi \otimes \xi)}_{F(A)} = y_m \Rightarrow [f(A) \otimes I]^{U(\phi \otimes \xi)}_B = f(x_m) \quad (2)$$

where I use the notation $[I \otimes B]_A^{U(\phi\otimes\zeta)}$ to indicate the value of $I \otimes B$ in its state $U(\phi\otimes\zeta)$ when the apparatus is set to measure A on the other party etc.

But from (1) and (2) I cannot deduce

$$[f(A) \otimes I]_B^{U(\phi\otimes\zeta)} = f([A \otimes I]_B^{U(\phi\otimes\zeta)})$$

simply because

$$[I \otimes B]_A^{U(\phi\otimes\zeta)} = Y_m$$

$$\nrightarrow [I \otimes B]_{f(A)}^{U(\phi\otimes\zeta)} = Y_m$$

This implication only goes through if we do not distinguish $[I \otimes B]_A^{U(\phi\otimes\zeta)}$ from $[I \otimes B]_{f(A)}^{U(\phi\otimes\zeta)}$ as in your 1977 paper, and this is what I meant by saying your proof assumed locality.

I would then want to argue that your proof of nonlocality is really a proof of nonlocality, if we decide to hang on to the plausibility of Correlation (which after all is a particular case of the extended Spectrum Rule for genuinely communicable observables, which you allowed in your 1974 Synthese paper).

Do let me know what you think about this.

Now let me make a few comments on your new paper:

P19 In your discussion of explicable indeterminism, the reason that the probabilities for each λ are constrained by (CH) is that $p(ST, \lambda)$ is itself explicable in the factorized form,

$$p(ST, \lambda) = \int_0^1 S(x, \lambda) \cdot T(x, \lambda) dx.$$

In other words, in terms of a space of ordered pairs (x, λ) with a product measure defined on it derived from the uniform measure on x and the P -measure on λ , we are writing

$$\begin{aligned} p(S, T) &= \int_{\Lambda} p(ST, \lambda) e(\lambda) d\lambda \\ &= \int_0^1 \int_{\Lambda} S(x, \lambda) \cdot T(x, \lambda) e(\lambda) dx d\lambda \end{aligned}$$

So factorization has been restored at the (x, λ) level of description.

Now this is what I understand Shimony to be claiming, that at a suitably refined level of description factorizability holds, and its failure for any given level of description is an indication that that level is not refined enough.

Your discussion of explicable indeterminism seems ideally to bear out Shimony's claim, although I take it that you regard your discussion as a counter example to Shimony's support of Plasser and Horne in linking locality with factorizability.

I am genuinely confused and would appreciate further classification.

P.20. I am not happy with your discussion of Nelson's theorem. It is ambiguous what you mean by the remark 'each observable \tilde{A}_i is made to correspond to some random variable A_i '. If this means that A_i gives the ~~same~~ right probability distribution for \tilde{A}_i according to the statistical algorithm of QM, then it follows that $\langle \tilde{A}_i \rangle_{QM} = \langle A_i \rangle_{hv.}$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{and } \langle \tilde{S} \rangle_{QM} &= d_1 \langle \tilde{A}_1 \rangle_{QM} + d_2 \langle \tilde{A}_2 \rangle_{QM} + \dots \\ &= d_1 \langle A_1 \rangle_{hv.} + d_2 \langle A_2 \rangle_{hv.} + \dots \\ &= \langle d_1 A_1 + d_2 A_2 + \dots \rangle_{hv.} \\ &= \langle S \rangle_{hv.} \end{aligned}$$

But this makes your statement of Nelson's theorem trivially false.

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What Nelson did show was, if A_1
 corresponds to \tilde{A}_1 in the sense of
 have suggested, and if the set $\{\tilde{A}_1\}$
 is not pairwise commuting, then there
 exists a choice of coefficients λ such
 that the probability distributions for
 S and \tilde{S} do not agree (although the
expectation values will agree).

What Bell's argument shows, I used
 have thought, is that random variables
 that correspond to $\tilde{A}\tilde{B}$, $\tilde{A}\tilde{B}'$, etc cannot
 be just $A(\lambda)B(\lambda)$, $A(\lambda)B'(\lambda)$, etc., even
 if the correspondence is restricted to
getting only the expectation values right.
 I fail to see the connection here with
 Nelson's theorem.

p. 22 ff. I admire the ingenuity of your
 synchronization and prison models. With
 regard to the former I feel the term
conspiracy model might be more
 appropriate if they exactly reproduced
 all predictions in all circumstances,
 and never allow the two 'possessed'
 P.T.O

distributions to be produced! But I like
your suggestion that synchronization
models might actually be apparently
distinguishable from orthodox S.M.
am sure this is how progress in the
area of Correlation experiments will
ultimately lead to models. With regard to
the prism models I agree all this is
possible, and perhaps we must face
up to 'decheckboxization' in quantum
mechanics!

It was a great pleasure to meet
you again last summer. May I
wish you and your family a Prosperous
1981.

Yours ever
Michael
